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Abstract
Using the BEEPS dataset from Enterprise Surveys, I study the e¤ect of nancial leverage
(percentage of assets funded by bank loans) of rms on their decision to participate in
various trading activities, such as exporting, importing and two way trading (rms that
export and import). I determine that the intensity of nancial leverage does not inhibit
rms which export only from becoming two way traders, but it does inhibit rms which
import only or operate only within the national market to become two way traders. The
e¤ect is determined to be stronger for rms that operate only within the national market
than rms that import only. Since unobserved factors may inuence both trading activities
and nancial leverage, I instrument for nancial leverage using a variable that combines
overdue payments to suppliers and the relationship of rms with their lenders. I contribute
to the literature as I augment a model that determines the e¤ect of nancial leverage
on various trading activities by implementing di¤erences between industries due to their
level of external dependence and asset tangibility. Hence, the e¤ect of nancial leverage
is determined to vary between di¤erent trading activities within industries that exhibit
di¤erent levels of external dependence and asset tangibility.
Email: anakhoda@ucsc.edu. Address: Economics Department at University of California, Santa Cruz. I
would like to appreciate the invaluable guidance I have received from my PhD committee members, Joshua
Aizenman, Flora Bellone and Justin Marion. I am also grateful to Jennifer Poole and Sean Tanoos for their
helpful comments and suggestions. Any errors and omissions are mine.
Introduction
Exporters, importers and two-way traders pay varying up-front xed costs to participate in their
respective trading activities. To pay the large up-front xed costs associated with each mode
of trading activity, rms may have to borrow from banks in order to nance the purchase of
their assets, or nancially leverage their assets1 ;2 . As the costs associated with trading activities
can di¤er signicantly between each mode, rms participating in various trading activities can
be inuenced by the varying intensity of nancial leverage. For instance, rms that export
their nal product and import inputs, two-way traders, can incur greater xed costs than rms
that export only and import only as is discussed by Muuls and Pisu (2008), Haller (2010) and
Castellani et al. (2010). Financial leverage can inuence the decision of rms to participate
in various trading activities as is contended in Greenaway et al(2007), Bellone et al. (2010),
Manova (2010a), Manova (2010b) and Chor and Manova (2011).
With each particular trading activity requiring di¤erent levels of xed costs to participate,
the e¤ect of nancial leverage can vary between rms that either export only, or import only,
or participate as two way traders. Firms that have high existing nancial leverage can nd it
di¢ cult to borrow from banks in order to nance the purchases of their assets needed to expand
their trading activities. Financial leverage can inhibit rms that either trade in one direction
(export only or import only) or operate only within the national market to become two way
traders. An increase in nancial leverage can negatively impact rms from expanding their
trading activities. So far, the papers that have studied this relationship between nancial lever-
age and international trading activities have considered the decision of rms to either export or
import rather than be non-traders. In this paper, I contribute to the literature in investigat-
ing more specically the relationship between the extensive and intensive margins of nancial
leverage of rms and the decision of rms to become two way traders rather than participate as
1For the purpose of this paper, rms can import foreign inputs by either importing intermediate materials
of foreign origin, or purchasing foreign licensed equipment or obtaining internationally recognized quality cer-
tications such as ISO 9002. A greater detailed discussion on this variable has been undertaken in Nakhoda
(2012).
2Ahn, Khandewal et al (2011) discuss the issue of exporting through intermediaries, or indirect exporters,
which may lower the necessary xed costs for rms and hence the need for nancial leverage. I consider exporters
as those rms that export their products directly to foreign markets. Hence, direct exporters pay greater xed
costs than indirect exporters and direct exporters have greater control of their customers in the destination
market.
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rms that export only, import only, and trade only within the national market.
I employ the World Banks Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
(BEEPS), which is a rm level panel data set from 27 countries across Central and Eastern
Europe and Central Asia. A total of 7,288 small and medium enterprises were surveyed in
either 2005 or 2009, with 3,600 rms surveyed in 2005 and 3,688 surveyed in 2009 on an ex-
tensive number of topics such as nancial leverage, rm size, capacity constraints, sales, and
employment characteristics. The survey also provides variables on the decision of rms to partic-
ipate in a particular trading activity, such as exporting and importing3 . These variables can be
constructed to determine whether rms trade two way, that is export and import concurrently.
I conduct probit estimations of the e¤ect of the extensive and intensive margins of nancial
leverage on the various dummy variables that account for the di¤erent trading activities (export
only, import only and trade only within the national market) against two way traders. I deter-
mine that the inuence of nancial leverage between two way traders and rms that participate
in other trading activities vary across each trading activity. For instance, rms that either im-
port only or trade only within the national market are likely to be constrained by the nancial
leverage as they seek to expand their trading activities to become two way traders than rms
that export only. As the variable on nancial leverage can su¤er from potential endogeneity
and omitted variable bias, I implement an instrumental variable estimation with the help of an
excluded instrument that accounts for a negative liquidity shock through determining whether
rms have overdue payments to their suppliers and apply for a loan or a line of credit.
In addition to the instrumental variable estimation, I use an empirical study that bases the
demand for external funds on exogenous variations that cannot be controlled by rms but may
inuence the degree of their nancial leverage. For instance, rms may belong to an industry
in which they are likely to be externally dependent and are characterized by a high degree of
collateralizable tangible assets that makes them attractive to lenders. I augment the model in-
troduced by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) as I consider the relation between the external
dependence and asset tangibility of the industries and the preference of rms for the internal
3Out of the 7,288 observations, 6,628 were unique rms in either 2005 or 2009. The rest of the rms were
interviewed in both 2005 and 2009. A total of 3,600 rms were surveyed in 2005 and 3,688 rms were surveyed
in 2009. The results perceived inaccurate by the interviewers are dropped.
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and external sources of funding. In order to start production, rms need to purchase assets and
invest in xed and sunk costs associated with their trading activities by allocating their internal
and external sources of funds. This allocation of funds may vary between industries that exhibit
di¤erent levels of external dependence or nancial vulnerability and asset tangibility. I divide the
sample into di¤erent subgroups based on industry characteristics such as external dependence
and asset tangibility. For example, industry attributes on the dependence of external funds and
proportion of assets constituted by tangible assets, such as plant, property and equipment can
determine whether rms will seek nancial leverage to nance their investments. This is an
important contribution of this paper as it determines whether rms that either export only, or
import only, or operate only within the national market are likely to be nancially leveraged
within industries that have an inherent nature to demand greater external funds and possess
collateralizable assets. This will help to explain whether the inuence of the extensive and the
intensive margins of nancial leverage on the investment of rms in two way trading activities
rather than the other trading activities is either mitigated or magnied for rms that belong to
certain industries.
Relevant Literature
Since the seminal paper of Melitz (2003), the xed costs related to exporting has been examined
extensively. Kasahara and Lapham (2008) focus on some of the xed costs related to importing
due to learning and the acquisition of foreign procedures rms may have to undertake4 . In order
to compare the need for complementary assets required by importers that may not be necessary
for exporters, Martins and Opromolla (2011) assert that even though wage premiums tend to
be higher for rms that participate in international trade than non-traders, the rm and worker
characteristics di¤er between rms that export only and rms that import (import only and trade
two way). The former pay higher wages only because they are bigger and can sell more than the
non-exporters, while the latter pay higher wages not only because they are bigger in size and can
sell more than the non-importers but employ workers that are more productive than the average
workers. This exhibits greater absorptivecapacity of importers as they need to supplement
4Wagner (2011) is an excellent survey of literature on the empirical studies related to international trade,
exporting as well as importing, and rm performance.
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production with more knowledge-intensive inputs. Furthermore, Altomonte and Bekes (2010)
describe the need of importers to use their inputs in the right proportion, where rms have
to deal with trade complexity between themselves and the suppliers, imperfect substitutability
between domestic and foreign inputs and more importantly, the associated sunk costs to search
for the right inputs available in the international markets. The inuence of nancial leverage
on the various international trading activities will help to determine whether rms that either
import only or export only are likely to be more constrained than two way traders.
Castellani et al (2010) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) suggest that importers purchase
relevant inputs to produce high quality output, which in turn is likely to be exported. Haller
(2010) asserts that rms which import only pay similar average wages to rms that trade two
way, while rms that export only do not pay signicantly higher wages than rms that do not
participate in international trading activities. With investments in complementary assets needed
for rms to become importers, this can create a nancial wedge that can be estimated by the
intensity of the nancial leverage.
The relationship between trade activities of rms and their ability to obtain external nance
has been a focus of many recent papers, such as Chaney (2005), Greenaway et al (2007), Muuls
et al. (2008), Manova (2010), Chor and Manova (2011), Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010)
and Bellone et al (2010). International trading activities demand greater nancing by banks as
there is time lag between disbursement of goods and receipt of payments. Short-term nancing
by banks is critical for the day to day activities of rms, regardless of the fact whether they
participate in international trade or not. However, rms that are involved in international trade
activities also need to make substantial investments which involve up-front payments in terms
of xed costs related to international trade and require long-term commitment to international
trade. When rms decide to enter production of particular goods, it is necessary to take into
account the specications of the good required by the consumers in the destination markets.
Firms build plants and production facilities that are required to meet certain parameters set by
the clients in the foreign markets. Such costs require rms to make substantial payments, in
many cases up to a few million dollars. Therefore, the aforementioned literature does mention
the role of nancial leverage and constraints on rms that participate in international trading
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activities but does not determine whether rms participating in di¤erent trading activities rather
than trade two way are inuenced by the extensive and intensive margins of nancial leverage.
With this paper, I aim to ll this void in the literature.
Muuls (2008) determines that xed costs of trading internationally can be nanced by rms
through nancial markets5 . Such rms must pledge assets as collateral. Debt is borrowed
against xed assets, which can free up internal funds for investments in activities that cannot
be easily collateralizable, such as research and development activities and payment of up-front
costs related to international trade as is considered in Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and
Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010). Bustos (2011) discusses the gains in export revenue by
exporting rms that allow such rms to purchase inputs embedded with higher technology as
they face liberalized trade regimes. In addition, Chaney (2005) considers the reliance of internal
liquidity as a method to nance international trading activities as information asymmetries be-
tween foreign markets can make it di¢ cult to nd potential domestic lenders. The accumulation
of debt as rms nance their purchases of assets increases the nancial leverage of rms and
subsequently reduces their nancial health. Although, rms may need to rely on their internal
funds to nance the xed costs associated with international trading activities, they may also
be required to borrow extensively in order to purchase the tangible assets associated with such
activities. Baggs and Brander (2006) determine the link between reduction in export and import
tari¤s on the nancial leverage of exporting and importing rms respectively. Using data on
Canadian rms, they nd that reduction in export tari¤s reduces the nancial leverage of export-
oriented rms, while reduction in import tari¤s has an opposite e¤ect on the nancial leverage
of import-competing rms. Export-oriented rms accumulate greater prots, which allows them
to reduce their nancial leverage, due to easier access to larger markets while import-competing
rms earn less prots and may subsequently increase their nancial leverage as they are exposed
to greater pressure from foreign competitors. Considering the role of nancial leverage on the
international trading activities of rms, I study whether the percentage of assets nanced by
bank loans can inuence the decision of rms to participate in a relevant international trading
activity as it may determine their ability to accumulate revenue and their capacity to borrow
5Another method rms can adopt is to seek new equity. As per the hypothesis of the pecking orderin Myers
(1984) and subsequent literature, bank loans are a preferred source than seeking new equity.
5
from banks in order to expand their international trading activities.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) introduce the notion that industry level decomposition of de-
pendence of rms on external nance becomes critical to the study relating rm growth and
investment opportunities. The degree of nancial leverage indicates the solvency of rms and
their ability to seek bank loans6 . Further, Braun (2003) and Braun and Larrain (2005) study the
relationship between rm growth and asset tangibility, dened as the percentage of total assets
composed by net plant, property and equipment with the latter considering the relationship
under economic recessionary conditions. As is explained in Besedes et al. (2011), rms that
belong to more tangible industries are also more likely to have lower survival rates as banks will
be able to recover a greater amount from such rms in case of default of loans. In countries
with poor nancial contracts and lower nancial development, rms that trade are forced to
provide a greater amount of assets as collateral. Industries with lower nancial dependence are
likely to contain a larger number of rms due to the increasing costs associated with nancial
vulnerability in such countries.
Production requires purchase of xed assets. I analyze whether rms that tend to be more
leveraged than others are likely to be two way traders as I employ a similar strategy to Gorod-
nichenko and Schnitzer (2010). However, instead of using a subjective variable based on the
opinion of rms on their access to nance and cost of nance as an indicator to nancial con-
straint, I use nancial leverage as a proxy for nancial constraint, similar to Greenaway et al
(2007). Claessens and Tzioumis (2006) discuss the problems of biasness that may arise with
subjective questions, as better performing rms are less prone to complain about their nancial
constraints.
Melitz (2003) documents the relationship between productivity and the decision of rms to
export. However, the literature on export hysteresis claims that the decision of rms to export is
"history-dependent". Dixit (1989) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989) highlight that rms which
have already paid the sunk and xed costs to export are more likely to do so in the future,
even if they face a negative productivity shock and the reaction to exogenous shocks is generally
6Firm that are highly nancially leveraged have a high percentage of their assets backed by debt or bank
loans. Firms are in a risk of being insolvent if their creditors demand repayment of the debt. Therefore, higher
the nancial leverage greater the risk of bankruptcy. However, if rms face a positive exogenous shock that
provides easier access to capital markets, rms are willing to increase their nancial leverage.
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slow . This explains the existence of exporters with a varying degree of productivity levels.
Negative productivity shocks to rms may not inuence their decision to participate in trade if
the participation of rms is history-dependent. Firms that face negative liquidity shocks which
result in delayed payments to suppliers due to decrease in productivity levels may not necessary
change their trade status, particularly if their status is history-dependent.
I extend this strand of literature as I examine the inuence of the extensive and intensive
margins of nancial leverage on two way traders relative to rms that are not two way traders.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study that focuses on the relationship between
nancial leverage of rms and their decision to trade two ways rather than undertake other
trading activities. Furthermore, I consider whether the presence of rms in a low nancial
vulnerable industry or in an industry characterized by high asset tangibility has a varying impact
on the aforementioned e¤ects related to their nancial leverage as rms choose to participate in
two way trade rather than other international trading activities.
Theoretical Background
The theoretical model is borrowed from Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) and Muuls (2008).
Firms can use internal nance or external nance in order to purchase xed assets used for
production but sunk costs paid related to the exports of the nal product and the import of
foreign inputs, including raw materials, must be nanced from their internal resources. Muuls
(2008) mentions the di¤erent ways rms may nance the xed costs to participate in interna-
tional trading activities. First, it may use internal funds generated by prots from domestic
sales to pay for xed and sunk costs related to trading activities. Second, rms may receive
a positive exogenous shock due to gains in productivity levels that may allow them to use the
extra funds towards investment activities. This is also similar to the idea suggested by Bustos
(2011) as trade liberalization procedures may create incentive for exporting rms to generate
greater export revenues and subsequently purchase inputs embedded with higher technology.
Third, rms may borrow externally in the nancial markets but in order to do so must pledge
their assets as collateral.
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Supported by the pecking orderin Myers and Majluf (1984), the majority of the external
nancing obtained by rms is debt. I consider the signicance of the ratio of debt to assets
on the decision of rms to trade internationally. The productivity levels under perfect capital
markets may determine whether rms are able to export or import foreign inputs, but their
nancial leverage ratio under imperfect capital markets will determine whether rms are able
to increase debt against their assets and hence borrow to participate in international trade.
As rms can pledge collateral to pay for their xed costs, they are more likely to borrow
externally to fund their purchase of xed assets and use internal funds to pay for the xed costs.
Depending upon the characteristics of the industry rms belong, such as high external depen-
dence or high collateralizable assets, they can borrow funds to nance their investment projects
and subsequently use internal funds to nance international trading activities. I augment the
model introduced by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) by adding industry level indicators on
external dependence and asset tangibility as is considered in Manova (2010a), Manova (2010b)
and Chor and Manova(2011).
The following is the sequence of shocks and decision making processes similar to that laid
out by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) for rms to expand production.
 Stage 0: Firms face an exogenous shock to liquidity (through a decrease in productivity
levels) which can inuence their needs for nancing the purchase of xed assets through
bank loans. Firms that are more sensitive to negative productivity shock are likely to be
more nancially leveraged.
 Stage 1: Firms will decide whether to export and/or import, or operate only within the
national market, based on their nancial leverage. Firms that have high percentage of
their xed assets nanced by bank loans may prefer to use their internal funds to lower
the leverage ratio instead of paying the associated xed and sunk costs to participate in
trade. Hence, such rms are less likely to expand their international trading activities.
 Stage 2: Firms purchase xed assets in order to expand production and demand nancial
assistance from banks in terms of loans. Firms that seek nancial leverage of xed assets
can use the internal funds to participate in international trading activities. Financial lever-
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age indicates the nancial health of rms and lower the nancial leverage more nancially
healthier are the rms, as they tie up a lower percentage of assets to their debt. A negative
relationship between the intensity of nancial leverage and international trading activity
determines the importance of nancial health to their international trading activities, as
rms with lower nancial leverage are more likely invest in international trading activities.
Firms face an exogenous shock such as overdue payments to suppliers, which can inuence
the availability of liquidity. Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) assert that rms do not have
any control over late payments made by suppliers. This shock can be characterized as L 2
(0; L),where L is the likelihood that the rms will face a negative liquidity shock. Firms
that receive a negative liquidity shock will likely increase their demand for nancial leverage
by applying for loans from lenders as they may need to substitute the lack of liquid assets in
order to nance their production. Khawaja and Mian (2008) determine that majority of rms
in emerging markets exposed to negative liquidity shocks are likely to face nancial distress as
they may not successfully hedge against the negative liquidity shocks. Such nancial distress can
have long term e¤ect on the investment strategy of rms as it can impact their nancial leverage.
I assume the probability that rms will have su¢ cient internal funds to nance production is q
and the probability that rms will not have su¢ cient funds is 1   q: Therefore, accounting for
the likelihood that rms receive a liquidity shock, I get q   L and 1  q + L respectively. As
negative liquidity shocks should a¤ect the cashow of rms, it will have similar e¤ect on the
probability that internal sources are utilized to fund production regardless of the direction of
trade.
If rms do not incur any xed costs related to export of their nal products or import of
foreign inputs, f is the prot where f = 0: If rms do undertake international trading activities,
the likelihood of having internal funds will decrease by T :  indicates the prots accumulated
through externally nancing of the assets through bank loans.
If rms do export or import, their prots should be greater than non-exporters or non-
importers respectively, in order to make the payment of xed costs related to international
trading activities viable. If they externally nance their production process, the prots should
be less than if they trade by utilizing internal sources of nance.
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If rms do not export nor import, the prot function can be expressed as:
E() = (q   L)0 + (1  q + L)
The probability that rms can use internal cashow to nance production and their trade
activities is reduced by the exogenous shock. Subsequently, their need for nancial leverage is
increased by the exogenous shock. We also assume 0 >  due to the presence of informa-
tion asymmetries between the lenders and the borrowers that entail deadweight losses, which
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) dene as agency costs.
Suppose that rms are likely to spend the internal funds (T ) to participate in international
trading activities (T ) (pay the xed costs associated with it) in stage 1. The expected prot
will be:
E(jT ) = (q   L   T )T0 + (1  q + L + T )T   TCT
where TCT is the xed cost to participate in international trade. I also assume that T0 > 
T

due to the presence of agency costs. The equations are similar to that expressed in Gorod-
nichenko and Schnitzer (2010).
Manova (2010a), Manova (2010b) and Chor and Manova(2011) study the e¤ects of nancial
tangibility and external dependence at the industry level on the extensive and intensive margins
of exports and are the basis for the augmentation of this model. As potential prots for rms
vary with their productivity levels, the rms above a certain productivity cuto¤ will be able to
obtain outside nancing and produce for the foreign market if they are exporters and purchase
from the foreign market if they are importers. This cuto¤ will be higher within industries
that need greater external nancing and within industries that have fewer tangible assets (with
cs dened as the fraction of production costs used to purchase tangible or hard assets and
ds dened as the fraction of production costs externally nanced to purchase xed assets)7 .
P captures negative shocks to productivity (along with negative liquidity shocks, P can also
include rising production costs, falling prot margins etc), while ds and cs capture the exposure
70 < ds; cs < 1:
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of rms to shocks on their nancial leverage. Given the amount of debt borrowed from banks and
holding nancial development constant across countries, rms that belong to more nancially
vulnerable industries will pay greater nancial costs associated with the loan. On the other
hand, if tangible assets constitute a larger proportion of total assets, the nancial costs will
be lower but a counter-argument by Besedes et al. (2011) states the probability of failure of
rms will be higher for a given interest rate as more assets can be seized from the borrowers.
This indicates higher risk to the borrowers. However, development of nancial institutions
within a country increases investments in more nancially vulnerable industries and industries
characterized with lower asset tangibility as development of nancial institutions allows to reduce
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, hence lowering the costs of borrowing.
Introducing external dependence and asset tangibility into the model, the equations can be
stated as8 :
E() = (q   P )(1  cs)(1  ds)0 + (1  q + P )(cs)ds
and
E(jT ) = (q   P   T )(1  cs)(1  ds)T0 + (1  q + P + T )(cs)dsT   TCT
As cs converges to 1, the supply of nancial leverage by the investor is likely to increase.
Similar is the case if ds converges to 1. The greater the proportion of leverage spent on collateral,
nancial leverage can be obtained at a more favorable price but at higher risks. The greater
the external dependence, the larger the need for nancial leverage and higher the costs of
borrowing. On the other hand, collateral of rms can make nancial leverage more favorable,
due to lower costs and subsequently increase the prots from nancial leverage. Firms with
softassets are predicted to perform worse than rms with more tangible assets as they exhibit
lower growth rates. High external dependency can be costly to rms as it increases nancial
vulnerability to negative liquidity shocks, but it is within these industries that rms are more
likely to borrow to nance investment projects. Basically, as Rajan and Zingales (1998), Hur et
8Whether rms participate in international trade or not, the fraction of xed costs externally nanced will be
similar in both types of industries, high and low.
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al (2006), Manova (2010a), Manova (2010b) and Chor and Manova (2011) assert that nancial
development in countries allows rm growth within industries highly dependent on external
nancing and characterized by low asset tangibility.
If exporters and importers are similar in their investment patterns, I will observe them to have
similar demand for nancial leverage within both industries. However, the investment patterns
of exporters and importers can be di¤erent. Importers rely on greater input quality and demand
absorptive capacity related to their inputs, which may expose rms to greater needs of external
funds. The following empirical study will determine the pattern of investments undertaken by
rms that either export only, or import only or operate only within the national market, as I
consider the desire of rms to become two way traders rather than the aforementioned strategies
of trading activities.
The testable implication of this model is that the nancial leverage inuences the inter-
national trading activities of rms. As rms undertake certain trading activities due to the
variation in their nancial leverage, I will test the impact of nancial leverage on the decision
of rms to expand their international trading activities. The model above states that the ex-
ternal dependence and asset tangibility of industries dictate the demand for nancial leverage
by rms. I will further determine whether rms that exist within industries characterized by
di¤erent levels of external dependence and asset tangibility are restricted to particular trading
activities dependent upon the extensive and the intensive margins of their nancial leverage.
I predict that within externally dependent industries, rms that undertake larger nancial
leverage and possess a large proportion of intangible assets will less likely obtain additional
nance for investments required to become two way traders due to the lack of collateralizable
assets. On the other hand, rms that belong to industries where internal cashow constitutes
a large proportion towards the funding of their investments will have their trading activities
inhibited by their nancial leverage as rms may not be able to obtain su¢ cient credit from
lenders to invest in the expansion of their production process. Furthermore, rms within indus-
tries with high asset tangibility may not invest in trading activities if they prefer to limit the
exposure of their collateralizable assets to the investors in case of default. Hence, the intensity of
nancial leverage would lower their likelihood of expanding their trading activities. In addition,
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rms belonging to industries characterized by a smaller proportion of collateralizable assets may
nd it di¢ cult to invest in the expansion of their trading activities through increase of nancial
leverage as they may own fewer tangible assets and their investments in knowledge intensive
intangible assets account for a signicant proportion of their total assets.
The Data
The Enterprise Surveys, which provides rm level data, is commonly known as The Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) dataset in the Central and Eastern
European and Central Asian countries and is created jointly by the World Bank and the Eu-
ropean Bank for Reconstruction and Development 9 . There are 6,628 rms in a panel of 7,288
observations, with many rms only surveyed once. In Appendix A, I dene the variables. In
Appendix B, I list the names of the countries considered in the sample, with the number of
observations for each country. I only consider rms that belong to manufacturing industries,
ISIC Revision 3.1 sectors 15 to 37, and eliminate all rms that have been surveyed in years other
than 2005 and 2009. The data on domestic credit provided by banking sector is collected from
World Development Indicators by the World Bank.
The industry level data on external dependence and asset tangibility has been borrowed from
Manova et al (2011).
[Figure 1 about here]
In Figure 1, I show the nancial leverage of rms engaging in various trading activities. Two
way traders are most likely to be nancially leveraged while domestic rms are least likely.
Using domestic credit provided by banking sector (percentage of GDP) as a proxy for the
amount of credit available within the country, I graph the relationships between two way traders
against various trading activities and the proxy for country level domestic credit in Appendix C.
In Appendix D, I graph the relationship between the extensive margin of nancial leverage and
the intensive margin of nancial leverage and domestic credit. I observe a positive relationship
9Enterprise surveys are available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. As with every survey, some data
collected was marked as being doubtful by the interviewers, as the accuracy of the data collected is ranked. I
have eliminated any observations that have been marked as doubtful by the interviewers.
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across the board indicating that two way traders are likely to be more prominent in countries
with greater nancial development, where rms are also likely to be more nancially leveraged.
Results
Probit Estimation
The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether rms which are nancially leveraged are more
likely to be two way traders than rms that export only, import only and trade only within the
national market. A dummy variable, which is also our dependent variable for each regression,
accounts for the decision of rms to trade two way against the other trading activities, interna-
tional or only within the national market. Two way traders are assigned a value of 1 and rms
that either export only, or import only or trade only within the national market are assigned
a value of 0. The independent dummy variable accounting for xed assets nanced by bank
loans is assigned a value of 1 if rms do have any of their assets purchased via bank loans (not
leveraged) and 0 if they have none of their xed assets nanced by bank loans.
The regression equation is:
Y ijet = 1EXTFINijet + 2zijet + t + j + e + "ijet
where Y ijet is the dependent variable for rm i, which makes a decision to export, import
or undertake both activities at time t, j is the 3 digit ISIC Rev 3.1 industry, and e is the
EU membership status. EXTFINijet accounts for the decision of rms to seek bank loans to
purchase their xed assets. Y is binary, with two outcomes ,1 or 0. I assume that Y takes the
form Pr(Y = 1jX) = (X 0): The "ijet  N(0; 1); where Y = 1 if Y  > 010 :The standard
errors are clustered at the industry level. Depending on the particular regression, EXTFINijet
either indicates the extensive margin, which determines whether the rms have nanced the
purchase of their xed assets from bank loans, or the intensive margin, which is calculated as
the percentage of assets nanced by bank loans. The intensive margin is only considered for
10All results, except under the instrumental variable section, are calculated as the marginal e¤ects at the mean
values of the independent variables.
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rms that have at least one percent of their assets nanced by bank loans. zijet is a vector
of rm characteristics. Productivity, rm size, skill intensity, workforce composition in terms
of educated workers and in-house formal training, along with innovative strategies of rms,
age of rm and their capacity utilization have been used as control variables. The variable
on productivity is calculated as value-added (sales less cost of labor and materials) divided
by the number of total production workers. It is considered as a ratio to the average value of
productivity for all rms within the industry, in a given country for a given year. Wagner (2002)
uses a similar technique for average wage per employee in order to calculate the deviation of
rm productivity from the industry average. Productivity e¤ects may be interdependent upon
other rms in the industry through spillover e¤ects11 . e accounts for the time-invariant xed
e¤ect dummies at the regional (EU membership) and j accounts for 3 digit industry level in
order to observe industry characteristics that are otherwise not captured, while t accounts for
time dummies. "ijet is the error term.
The variable accounting for the intensity of nancial leverage is considered as two separate
proxies. Proxy 1 considers the intensity of nancial leverage as the ratio to the industry level
average of nancial leverage. Proxy 2 considers the intensity of nancial leverage as a variable
accounting the distance between the respective rms and the rms with the least nancial
leverage within their industry12 . With the existence of asymmetric information between rms
and the lenders, a hierarchy of preferences on various sources of nancing, internal sources and
bank loans, can be established between rms13 . Firms may seek nancial leverage given the
amount of nancial leverage sought by other rms within the industry in order to counter the
costs of asymmetric information.
Joint dependence of other rms regarding nancial strategies within the industry can lead to
variation in nancial structure even after controlling for industry xed e¤ects. MacKay (2005)
11Another reason is that the collection of monetary values in the BEEPS dataset vary across periods as they
may have been recorded in local currencies in 2005 and US dollars in 2009. As I do not use country xed e¤ects,
due to the small number of observations, I can run into the problem of reporting wrong monetary values. Using
the ratios for the variables with monetary values allows to avoid this issue.
12The xed e¤ect industry dummy is at the 3 digit level as there is a potential problem of very few number
of observations within certain 4 digit ISIC industries. As industry averages can still be calculated at the 4 digit
industry level, I prefer to implement this level of disaggregation to calculate the various proxies of the intensity
of nancial leverage.
13Kumar (2007) is a critical review of articles that use various measures of nancial leverage. Various frame-
works are discussed in the paper.
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stresses that it is important to note the variation in nancial structure of rms that can be as a
result of jointly determined nancial decisions. One of the characteristics of a proxy suggested
by MacKay (2005) is that it incorporates nancial leverage adjusted for typical rms within their
industry in a given year. In lieu of this strategy, I include a variable that has been adjusted to
the average rm within the industry in a given year, and state it as Proxy 1. Proxy 2 accounts
for the di¤erence between the respective rms and the rms with the minimum nancial leverage
recorded within the industry in a given country for a given year. As I control for characteristics
of rms such as productivity, capacity utilization and number of full-time employees, the rms
with the least nancial leverage can be considered more nancially healthier rms. If decisions
are indeed jointly determined, the optimal amount of leverage for rms will be based on the
nancial leverage sought by other rms. Assuming that costs of nancial leverage increase as
greater percentage of assets are nanced by bank loans, the rms with the least percentage of
their assets nanced by bank loans will be paying the lowest cost. A lower value for both proxies
will indicate better nancial health.
[Table 1 about here]
There are 2,056 two way traders, 311 exporters only, 2,616 importers only and 1,905 rms
that trade only within the national market within the sample14 . In Table 1, I show that two way
traders are more likely to be nancially leveraged than all other types of rms. The coe¢ cient
on the extensive margin of nancial leverage is positive and signicant at the 1% level for two
way traders against rms that import only or trade only within the national market and at the
5% level against rms that export only. The coe¢ cient for domestic rms (foreign ownership less
than 10%) is signicant and negative across the sample, implying that rms which participate
as two way traders are more likely to be foreign rms. Number of full-time employees and
the dummy variable on formal training signicantly inuences two way traders across all the
other trading activities, while innovation and age of rm signicantly inuences two way traders
against rms that import only and rms that trade only within the national market. However,
two way traders are more likely to be more productive and have less skill intensity than rms
that operate only within the national market. The percentage of employees with a university
14 In the regression tables, a rm that operates only within the national market is labeled as "No Int. Trade".
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degree is positive and signicant for rms that trade two ways against those rms that trade
only within the national market. It is not signicant for rms that trade two ways against
rms that export only and import only. This implies that the percentage of employees with a
university degree is not signicantly di¤erent for rms that trade internationally, as such rms
may require to undertake investments in complementary knowledge-intensive assets.
[Table 2 about here]
In Table 2, I show that Proxy 1 negatively impacts the probability that rms are two way
traders rather than rms that import only and trade only within the national market, at the
1% level and at the 5% level of signicance respectively. Proxy 2 indicates that two way traders
are more likely to be nancially healthier than rms that trade only within the national market
and the e¤ect is signicant at the 5% level. Such rms are more likely to have nancial leverage
equal to that of the least nancially leveraged rms within the industry. There is a lower number
of observations than in Table 2 as only those rms that are nancially leveraged are considered.
The fact that Proxy 1 is signicant at the 1% level but Proxy 2 is not signicant indicates that
rms which import only will be less nancially healthier than two way traders in terms of the
ratio to the average nancial leverage within their industry but their nancial leverage itself
will not necessarily be signicantly greater than the least nancially leveraged (most nancially
healthy) within their industry. Further, the extensive margin positively inuences two way
trading activities, while the proxies on intensive margins negatively inuence two way traders.
This implies that although two way traders are likely to have borrowed from banks to nance
their assets, the degree of nancial leverage amongst rms that have borrowed will be the least
intense for two way traders.
In Table 2, I show that rms which export only are not di¤erent than two way traders in terms
of the intensity of nancial leverage as neither the rst proxy nor the second proxy signicantly
inuences the decision of such rms to become two way traders. The lack of signicance on
the impact of the proxies on the intensity of nancial leverage for rms that export only can
indicate that such rms may have the ability to generate internal funds through export revenues
to nance investments as two way traders. I also nd that rms which trade only within the
national market are likely to face more severe constraints in terms of nancial leverage as they
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are likely to be less nancially healthy in terms of both proxies. Firms that trade only within
the national market are likely to have nancial leverage greater than the average rm within
their industry and are also likely to be signicantly more leveraged than the least leveraged rm
within their industry.
Furthermore, innovation, formal training and number of employees are positive and signif-
icant for two way traders against rms that operate only within the national market. The
variable on innovation only inuences the rms that trade only within the national market. The
signicance of the coe¢ cient on formal training inuences the decision of rms to become two
way traders against their decision to trade only within the national market and import only.
An interesting nding in the Tables 1 and 2 is that once rms that export only have access to
nancial leverage, the variables that remain signicant are domestic rm and number of em-
ployees. Firms that import only are likely to be domestic rms, younger, have fewer employees
and are less likely to provide formal training than two way traders. Apart from being nancially
leveraged, rms that trade only within the national market are also less likely to innovate, less
likely to provide formal training to employees, are more likely to be skill-intensive and employee
fewer workers. The level of signicance for all the variables that are signicant varies between
the 5% and 1% level, with majority of the variables at the latter level. The probit estimation
has helped us determine the constraints that each rm undertaking a particular trading activity
faces, with rms that trade only within the national market generally facing the greatest con-
straints in terms of the variables used in this paper, followed by rms that import only. This
implies that given the distribution of nancial leverage, the rms that export only are likely to
be more similar to two way traders than rms undertaking other trading activities.
Robustness CheckInstrumental Variable Estimation
One of the major concerns with the results in the probit estimations above is the endogeneity
bias. Firms participating in international trading activities are likely to obtain nancial leverage
and bias the results of the extensive margin of nancial leverage upwards. On the other hand,
rms participating in international trading activities can earn greater prots and improve their
nancial health as they reduce their nancial leverage. This can bias the results of the intensive
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margin downwards. In order to account for the endogeneity bias, I introduce instrumental
variable estimation, which can be considered a robustness check to the probit estimation15 .
The excluded instrumental variable is a combination of two variables, overdue payments to
suppliers or trade credit, similar to one of the instrumental variables used in Gorodnichenko and
Schnitzer (2010), and an indicator on whether rms have started or renewed their relationship
with lenders by submitting an application for a loan or a line of credit16 ;17 . De Bonis et
al. (2010) assert that although activities such as internationalization of rms increases the
opaqueness of the banking relationship due to larger payments of sunk costs, rising intangibility
ratio and shifting of the collateral abroad, the length of the relationship between the bank and
the decision of rms to participate in trade does not have any signicant correlation. The
relationship between the rms and the banks should dene the access to capital by rms and
the nancial leverage ratio of the rms, which in turn should determine the decision of rms to
participate in international trading activities. Furthermore, the decision to trade should not be
inuenced directly by the excluded instrumental variable. As is mentioned in Cunat (2007), Fabri
and Klapper (2009) and Hydman and Serio (2010), rms may be able to seek overdue payments
from their suppliers if they have an overall market advantage compared to the suppliers as they
can then dictate their terms and conditions. One way to determine that trade credit does not
directly a¤ect exports or imports is to test the e¤ect of the changes in the interbank rate on
trade weighted credit contraction at the industry level as is done by Levchenko et al. (2010).
They nd that although various industries are a¤ected di¤erently by credit contractions, the
average e¤ect is zero. Therefore, this variable can provide us with an exogenous variation to
cash receipts based on the market conditions and the macroeconomic environment. Combining
it with an indicator for the establishment of a relationship with lenders allow us to consider
15Variables such as the level of employment can face an issue of reverse causality, as the dependent variable
can also inuence the explanatory variables. However, in this dataset, reverse causality is not a serious issue as
such variables do not vary much over a three year period. For instance, the correlation between current level of
employment and level of employment three years ago is 0.90.
16 Ideally I would have separated the two variables when conducting the instrumental variable estimation.
Although not reported, the results are very similar to those that I obtain in this section by combining the
variables. However, the two variables when separated reject the overidentications tests through Sargan statistics
for some of the regressions.
17The correlation between various trading activities and the excluded instrument variable ranges from 5%
to 26%, while the correlation between the excluded instrument and the extensive and the intensive margins of
nancial leverage ranges from 25% to 61%. This shows that the excluded instruments are correlated with the
endogenous variables but not necessarily with the dependent variables.
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those rms that seek trade credit or a loan. Firms that face negative liquidity shocks and
have attempted to establish a relationship with their lenders are more likely to be nancially
constrained, indicating a positive relationship between the nancial leverage of rms and the
excluded instrumental variable.
Minetti and Zhu (2011) account for the local supply of banking services available to rms as
one of their instrumental variables in order to control for endogeneity issues related to exporting
and credit constraints. The local supply of banking services will inuence the relationship
between rms and their creditors, hence their decision to apply for a loan or a line of credit.
Firms that do not seek to establish or renew their relationship with lenders, through a line
of credit or applying for loans, will be less likely to inuence their nancial leverage through
negative shocks to their liquidity as they will not face complications of holdup problems and
information asymmetries between the borrower and the lender18 . As per Bolton and Freixas
(2000) rms can be segmented as i) riskiest rms which cannot obtain any loans, ii) safer rms
which are able to take out bank loans and iii) safest rms which prefer to use their own internal
resources and avoid intermediation costs. Furthermore, as Hashi and Toci (2010) consider a
variable which a¤ects the decision of rms to participate in the nancial market but does not
have an impact on the decision of banks to lend, I use a similar technique by employing a variable
that accounts for the decision of rms to establish or renew its relationship with a lender19 .
The second stage regression equation is:
Y ijet = 1EXTFINijet + 2zijet + j + e + t + "ijet
and the rst stage regression equation is:
EXTFINijet = 1OV ERDUEijet + 2zijet + j + e + t + ijet
18Application for a loan does not necessarily imply that the rms are seeking to leverage their nancial assets.
As rms can borrow from non-nancial institutions, rms can obtain line of credit or a loan from non-nancial
institutions. Financial leverage is the percentage of assets nanced by bank loans. Therefore, this variable
accounting for the relationship with the lender does not necessarily have a one to one relationship with the
variable on the nancial leverage.
19Although Hashi and Toci (2010) do assert that rm size does a¤ect the decision of rms to apply for a loan,
the e¤ect is more likely to be determined by the amount of nancial leverage. Small rms are less likely to apply
for a loan because a) they may lack collateral and b) their capacity to borrow is much lower. Highly indebted
large rms can face the same challenges.
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where OV ERDUEijet accounts for rms owing payments to suppliers and have attempted to
establish a relationship with lenders by applying for a loan or a line of credit. zijet are the other
rm level characteristics, ijet is the error term, j and e are the xed e¤ects dummies such as
EU membership dummy and 3 digit ISIC Rev 3.1 industry code respectively and t is the time
dummy variable.
[Table 3 about here]
The results in Table 3 are quite similar to the probit estimation results in Table 1. However,
the p-value for the Wald test of rho=0 is greater than the 10% level for most of the regressions
(except in column 6), which indicates it is statistically insignicant. Therefore, our initial probit
estimation is consistent. Even though, I reject exogeneity for rms that trade only within the
national market, the results are very similar to that of the probit estimations. Furthermore,
the underidentication test and the weak identication tests reject the null hypothesis that the
instruments are either underidentied or weakly identied20 . The larger coe¢ cients recorded in
the instrumental variable estimation are a result of the positive e¤ect of the excluded instrument.
Firms that are overdue to their suppliers and have applied for a loan are more likely to be
nancially leveraged. Subsequently, it increases the likelihood that the rms are two way traders.
In Tables 4 and 5, I analyze the inuence of the intensive margin of nancial leverage on the
likelihood that rms are two way traders rather than exporters only, importers only and rms
that trade only within the national market. To be consistent with the proxies for the intensive
margin, the excluded variables have been calculated as the ratio to industry average of the
OV ERDUE variable and as a di¤erence to the industry minimum of the OV ERDUE variable
respectively for Proxy 1 and Proxy 2 on the intensity of nancial leverage. The F-statistics
indicate that the excluded instruments do not su¤er from any weak instrument problems in any
of the regression in Tables 3, 4 and 5.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
20The excluded instrument is viable also because rm level characteristics, such as productivity and capacity
utilization, included in the regression do not signicantly alter the power of these tests. Similar result is obtained
by Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010).
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Similar to the results for the extensive margin of nancial leverage in Table 3, I cannot reject
exogeneity in Table 4 and Table 5. Again, the probit estimations can be considered as consistent
across all regressions. I obtain similar results for the reported probit estimation on the intensity
of nancial leverage and its e¤ect on trading activities. As predicted, the coe¢ cients under
the instrumental variable estimation are larger and indicate the positive e¤ect of the excluded
instrument on the endogenous variable. This implies that the rms will increase the percentage
of their assets nanced by bank loans as they apply for loans and establish or renew their
relationship with lenders. With the assumption that the instruments are not weak and that
the exogeneity of the variables on nancial leverage cannot be rejected, I can conclude that the
probit estimations in the previous are consistent and e¢ cient. I will use the probit estimations
in the next section.
External Dependence and Asset Tangibility
In order to control for the endogeneity of the variables on the extensive and intensive margins of
nancial leverage, I use an industry level indicator that characterizes the nancial vulnerability
and the asset tangibility of the respective industries. With the assumption that industry level
indicators are exogenous to rm characteristics, this is another robustness test for the probit es-
timations above. This method is similar to that used by Berman and Hericourt (2010), Manova
(2010), Chor and Manova (2010), Manova et al. (2011) and Braun and Larrain (2005) as they
implement a proxy for nancial dependence by Rajan and Zingales (1998). This approach helps
to exploit di¤erences in credit availability across industries that may prevent rms from under-
taking international trading activities. I divide the industries into two subsamples, industries
with low and high external dependence and low and high asset tangibility respectively. The
e¤ects of nancial leverage on international trading activities will be strongly evident within
certain industries. As dened in Rajan and Zingales (1998), external dependence of rms is
calculated as the amount of desired investment that cannot be nanced through internal funds
generated within the business, while asset tangibility is calculated by Braun (2003) as the amount
of percentage contributed by net plant, property and equipment over total assets.
Berman and Hericourt (2010) suggest that there is priori no reason for endogeneity bias
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between participation in international trade and nancial leverage to be distributed across in-
dustries with di¤erent levels of external dependence or asset tangibility. This can be explained
by the fact that nancial leverage is rm level and external dependence and asset tangibility are
industry level and uncorrelated by design, while the correlation itself between nancial leverage
and the two industry level indicators are low. The correlation between external dependence and
nancial leverage (extensive) is 0.06%, while correlation between asset tangibility and nancial
leverage (extensive) is 7%. The correlation between external dependence and the two measures
of the intensity of nancial leverage is -3% and -0.04% respectively, while correlation between
asset tangibility and the two measures of the intensity of nancial leverage is -10% and -0.04%
respectively. In addition, nancial leverage at the rm level should not be correlated either
to the industry level of external dependence and asset tangibility as the data for the industry
level is derived from US data and averaged for the period from 1980-1999. The purpose behind
using US data on external dependence and asset tangibility from Manova et al (2011) is that it
characterizes one of the most advanced and sophisticated nancial markets and thus reects the
true demand by rms for external dependence and determines the optimal presence of tangible
assets in each industry. Further, it eliminates the possibility of external dependence and asset
tangibility to endogenously respond to the level of nancial development within a country.
The gures and tables in this section show the relationship between external dependence
and asset tangibility within each industry and the percentage of rms that are either exporters
only, or importers only or two way traders within high and low external dependent and asset
tangibility industries. In Figure 2, I observe a negative relationship (albiet at -3% level) between
the medians of external dependence and asset tangibility, as is predicted in Manova (2011). This
indicates that in countries which tend to have their median industry more externally dependent
are also likely to have their median industry characterized by lower asset tangibility. This is
consistent with the prediction that as countries develop their nancial markets, investments
will tend to ow into industries characterized by higher external dependence and lower asset
tangibility. As I consider lesser developed nancial markets in this paper, asset tangibility
can be positively related to domestic credit, as countries with less domestic credit may exhibit
poor business environments with weak legal protections for the lender as well as the borrower,
23
undermining the ability of tangible assets to reduce informational asymmetries.
[Figure 2 about here]
In Figures 3 and 4, I show a pattern of investments in trading activities within industries
characterized by the level of external dependence and asset tangibility. The rms that trade
only within the national market are not reported in the gures below.
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
Although, the pattern of investments may di¤er as there are a fewer percentage of rms
that trade two way within less externally dependent industries than within the more externally
dependent industries, the rankings across trading activities does not change as rms that import
only outnumber other international traders within both high and low external dependence and
asset tangibility. The percentage of two way traders fall within the low externally dependent and
high asset tangibility industries, compared to their counterpart industries. The lower percentage
of two way traders within an industry can indicate the preference of trading activities, as rms
that have access to external funds and rms that possess lower tangible assets are more likely
to be two way traders. Firms can be constrained to expand trading activities within industries
where external funds are required to produce and undertake their existing trading activity. On
the other hand, rms can also be constrained to expand their trading activities within industries
characterized by less tangible assets.
The ranking of the trade activity between the asset tangibility of the industries remains
more or less consistent, as I observe all types of international traders to have a smaller percent-
age of participation within industries characterized by higher asset tangibility. Therefore, this
can relate to the discussion that rms which belong to industries characterized by high asset
tangibility tend to be more restrictive in expanding their international trading activities. Al-
though these gures show us a certain relationship between trading activities and industry level
external dependence and asset tangibility, the analysis in the next section will show whether
rms that obtain nancial leverage are more likely to participate as two way traders than other
international trading activities under varying industry level characteristics.
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In Appendix C, I show that two way trading is positively associated with the nancial
development within a country. Even though the industry level data is derived from the US,
one of the most nancial developed countries, the ranking of the external dependence and
asset tangibility should remain fairly stable across countries. It is unlikely that rms in poorer
developed nancial markets will reverse the ranking of the industries. In Appendix D, I graph
the di¤erent nancial proxies with respect to the domestic credit, and I observe that countries
with greater domestic credit will have rms that are generally more nancially leveraged.
In Appendix E, I correlate the country level medians of industry external dependence and
asset tangibility with domestic credit provided by the private sector as a percentage of GDP. The
positive relationship between external dependence and domestic credit is as predicted because
higher domestic credit available in the economy would generate growth within industries that
require higher external dependence. However, on the other hand, I observe a positive relationship
between domestic credit and asset tangibility. This is di¤erent from the pattern observed in
many developed countries. One explanation, as provided by Hass and Peeters (2004), is that
the poorer business environments as a result of weaker legal rights within many of the transition
economies, asset tangibility does not necessarily reduce the negative consequences lenders face
due to informational asymmetries between the borrowers and the lenders21 . On the other hand,
as discussed in an earlier section, rms that belong to an industry characterized by high asset
tangibility would neither borrow as that would increase the probability that a large proportion
of their assets are seized by inuential lenders (such as large or state owned banks) in case of a
loan default22 . Although, it is likely that countries with less domestic credit will record a lower
median value for asset tangibility across industries, this does not necessarily change the ranking
of asset tangibility across the industries.
The following analysis will determine the preference of rms to become two way traders
21The positive relationship between the median of asset tangibility and domestic credit is evident for countries
that are less developed within the sample(i.e. non-EU countries), while a negative relationship is evident for
countries that are more developed (EU countries). The lack of domestic credit in non-EU countries could be
lowering the incentive for industries characterized by high asset tangibility to grow. However, we do observe
trading patterns within industries to be more consistently distributed between low and high asset tangibility
industries. Though, this could be because there are a greater number of surveys conducted in the more developed
nancial markets.
22 It is observed that rms are less likely to make investments in trading activities within industries with lower
asset tangibility.
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against their decision to export only, import only, and operate only within the national market
given the di¤erent industry level environments of external dependence and asset tangibility. In
Appendix F, I list the number of observations per industry level characterization, with a low
number of observations in some cases. However, this weakness does not have a signicant impact
on the quality of results as I do observe a pattern similar to our predictions.
External Dependence
The industries are divided into subsamples according to their level of nancial vulnerability or
external dependence. Firms that belong to the more externally dependent industries are likely
to borrow loans from banks to nance the purchase of their xed assets and less likely to utilize
their internal sources of funds. If the expansion of trading activities requires investments in the
purchase of complementary assets, rms are likely to seek external nancing for such investments.
On the other hand, rms that belong to less externally dependent industries utilize their internal
sources of funds to purchase xed assets and in turn, may have lower amount of internal sources
of funds available to expand their international trading activities.
[Table 6 about here]
In Table 6, I observe that the extensive margin of nancial leverage does signicantly im-
pact the probability, at the 5% level, that rms which export only will rather trade two way
within industries characterized by low external dependence. None of the other variables on rm
level characteristics are signicant. However, within industries characterized by high external
dependence, I do not observe a signicant impact on the extensive margin of nancial leverage.
The only variables that are signicant are number of employees, formal training and skill inten-
sity, all at the 5% level, implying that within industries where rms are likely to be nancially
vulnerable or high externally dependent, rms that increase the number of employees, invest in
formal training and skill intensity are likely to be two way traders rather exporters only. On
the other hand, rms that are nancially leveraged will be more likely to be two way traders
than rms that import only and operate only within the national market across both types of
industries, with level of signicance of the probability between the 5% and 1% level.
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Kugler and Verhoogen (2009) discuss the exceptional performance of importers, stating that
they pay higher prices for inputs as they are more likely to purchase higher quality inputs to
complement their higher quality ouputs. Amiti and Koeining (2007) discuss the gains in labor
productivity as rms import by purchasing inputs of higher quality. Firms that import are
likely to purchase high quality inputs with complementary machinery and equipment which
may be priced higher than domestic inputs. In e¤ect, importers are more likely to nance their
purchases of assets through bank loans as they demand investments in complementary assets.
Variables such as domestic rm, age of rm and number of full-time employees signicantly
impact the probability that a rms are two way traders rather than importers within both types
of industries.
[Table 7 about here]
[Table 8 about here]
Considering rms are nancially leveraged, the proxies for the intensity of nancial leverage
in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that rms which export only are not signicantly impacted by the in-
tensity of their nancial leverage. Apart from skill intensity and number of full-time employees,
no other variable signicantly impacts the probability of rms that export only in nancially
vulnerable industries indicating that their dependence on external funds will allow it to expand
their trading activities. However, within low externally dependent industries, variables on inno-
vation and domestic rm are signicant at the 5% level, while skill intensity is signicant at the
10% level. The intensity of nancial leverage negatively impacts the probability of rms that
import only to become two way traders within industries with high nancial vulnerability and
rms that operate only within the national market to become two way traders within industries
with low nancial vulnerability. The signicance of nancial leverage is recorded at the 5%
level. For rms that undertake importing activities, the access to external funds may require
it to nance investments in complementary assets, hence increasing their intensity of nancial
leverage as they borrow funds against the assets owned. Ahn, Amiti et al (2011) and Haddad et
al (2011) suggest that import prices increased as the import values fell in nancially vulnerable
industries due to a supply contraction faced by the importers, especially during the recent credit
crisis of 2008-2009. This theory can suggest that importing rms may be borrowing from banks
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to nance the purchase of the more costly inputs or complementary assets in the more nancially
vulnerable industries, constraining rms that import only from becoming two way traders.
Asset Tangibility
Braun (2003) incorporates asset tangibility of rms into the model of Rajan and Zingales (1998).
Asset tangibility indicates the proportion of assets constituted by hard assetssuch as plant,
property and equipment rather than soft assetssuch as human capital and goodwill invested
by the rm. Chor and Manova (2011), Manova (2010a) and Manova (2010b) predict that in-
vestment activities of rms should be focused within industries that are externally dependent
and have low asset tangibility as countries becomes more nancially developed. As rms that
import only are more likely to be characterized by a greater intensity of nancial leverage within
industries that are nancially vulnerable, as shown in Tables 7 and 8, the intensity of nancial
leverage should signicantly inhibit such rms from becoming two way traders within industries
that require lower asset tangibility. On the other hand, the intensity of nancial leverage is sig-
nicant for rms that operate only within the national market within less nancially vulnerable
industries, as shown in Tables 7 and 8. This implies that nancial leverage should be signi-
cantly lower for two way traders rather than rms that operate only within the national market
within industries characterized by high asset tangibility. Therefore, as rms belonging to more
externally dependent industries invest in expanding their trade activities, it also indicates their
ability to invest in expanding their trade activities within industries that require lower asset
tangibility and vice versa.
[Table 9 about here]
In Table 9, there is no signicant e¤ect on two way trade against rms that export only within
either industries. Other variables such as domestic rm and formal training are likely to impact
the probability of rms that export only to become two way traders, at the 5% and 1% level,
within industries characterized by high asset tangibility. The number of full-time employees
is signicant at the 10% level within industries characterized by lower asset tangibility. High
asset tangibility can also indicate that rms which export only are not able to invest in formal
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training of employees that may be required to become two way traders. On the other hand,
the impact of the extensive margin of nancial leverage is positive for two way traders against
rms that import only within industries characterized by low asset tangibility at the 1% level
of signicance. Two way traders are positively impacted by the extensive margin of nancial
leverage within both industries against rms that trade only within the national market. It is
at the 1% level of signicance within industries characterized by high asset tangibility and at
the 5% level within industries characterized by low asset tangibility. An interesting aspect is
that the percentage of employees with a university degree is positive and signicant in industries
characterized by high asset tangibility for two way traders against rms that import only and
trade only within the national market at the 5% level. This implies that it is only those rms
that invest in knowledge intensive complementary assets such as highly educated workers are
likely to be two way traders within industries characterized by high asset tangibility. As more
variables signicantly a¤ect the decision of rms to trade two way against their decision to trade
only within the national market within industries characterized by high asset tangibility, rms
that are less likely to fail (for instance, those that observe greater productivity-levels) are also
more likely to expand their trading activities.
Besedes et al (2011) suggest that rms within industries characterized by high asset tangi-
bility are more likely to risk a greater proportion of their collateralizable assets as they seek
to nance their investments through bank loans. Such rms would reduce their probability of
undertaking investments that involve large xed costs as their decision to expand their trading
activities may become constrained by their nancial health. They may lack the willingness to
risk their tangible assets as they invest in expansion of their trading activities. On the other
hand, as importers only are likely to possess a greater proportion of knowledge-intensive in-
tangible investments, I observe such rms to be more nancially constrained within industries
characterized by low asset tangibility. The presence of high asset tangibility within industries
can lower the risks of information asymmetry for the lender but can also lead to potentially
greater proportion of the assets seized in terms of collateral in terms of default by the borrower.
[Table 10 about here]
[Table 11 about here]
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As predicted, in Tables 10 and 11, I show results that are mainly asymmetric to the results in
Tables 7 and 8. For instance, in Tables 7 and 8, I observe that nancial health is signicant for
rms that import only within industries characterized by high external dependence. As external
dependence and asset tangibility are negatively correlated, I observe a similar pattern for rms
within industries characterized by low asset tangibility in Tables 10 and 11. Similarly, the two
proxies on nancial health are negative and signicant at the 1% level for rms that operate
within the national market only within industries characterized by high asset tangibility23 .
Information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers suggests that the presence of tangi-
ble assets which investors can seize upon failure of repayment of loan provides rms the ability
to borrow. Castellani et al (2010) state the signicance of the complementary investments in
assets required by importers in order to integrate imported inputs into their production process.
Knowledge intensive assets can contribute a large proportion of their investments and as the
nature of such investments tend to be less tangible, nancial leverage within industries that are
characterized by lower proportion of tangible assets can signicantly a¤ect the probability that
rms are two way traders rather than importers only. Within an industry that lacks tangible
assets, it may indicate that rms are not able to back up their investments with collateraliz-
able assets, and their decision to become two way traders can be adversely a¤ected with their
intensity of nancial leverage. The lack of collateralizable assets observed within the industry
and the decision of importers to invest in non-collateralizable knowledge intensive intangible
assets can make it less attractive for investors to provide rms with external nancing. Within
industries characterized by high tangibility, age and domestic ownership signicantly impacts
the probability that rms are likely to be two way traders, indicating that they are likely to
be foreign owned and well established rms. Two way traders and rms that import only are
mainly similar in rm characteristics within industries characterized by high asset tangibility.
In Table 10, Proxy 1 on the intensity of nancial leverage negatively impacts the probability
at the 1% level that rms are two way traders rather than exporters only within industries
23 In Tables, 10 and 11, I do observe one of the proxies on the intensive margin of nancial leverage to inuence
rms that trade only within the national market within industries characterized by low asset tangibility and
rms that import only within industries characterized by high asset tangibility, but only at the 10% level of
signicance. I assume rms to be more sensitive to the intensity of nancial leverage within industries where the
level of signicance of the nancial leverage is observed to be greater.
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characterized by high asset tangibility. However, in Table 11, I do not see such an e¤ect for
Proxy 2. This indicates that rms which export only are likely to be less nancially healthier
than the average rm but not necessarily more nancially leveraged than the rms with the
lowest percentage of their assets funded by bank loans within industries characterized by high
asset tangibility. Firms that export only are not constrained by any of their rm characteristics
within industries that exhibit low asset tangibility.
Conclusion
I determine that rms which participate in various trading activities also face di¤erent nancial
constraints that inhibit their ability to expand their international trading activities, given the
nancial vulnerability and asset tangibility of their industry. The extensive margin of nancial
leverage positively inuences the probability that rms which have assets funded by bank loans
are likely to expand their trading activities from exporting only, importing only and trading only
within the national market to two way trading. However, the impact of the extensive margin of
nancial leverage on the probability that rms which export only are likely to become two way
traders is more subtle than for the rms that undertake other trading activities.
The intensive margin of nancial leverage does not inhibit rms that export only from
becoming two way traders, but it does inhibit rms that import only and operate only within
the national market to become two way traders. The e¤ect is stronger for rms that operate
only within the national market than rms that import only. Furthermore, the instrumental
variable estimation further establishes the results obtained from the probit estimations. The
signicance of this relationship di¤ers as nancial vulnerability and asset tangibility between
industries vary. Although, the extensive margin of nancial leverage is signicant within both
industries for rms that import only and rms that operate only within the national market,
it is the signicance on the intensive margin which di¤ers as nancial vulnerability and asset
tangibility varies between industries. I determine that within nancially vulnerable industries,
rms that import only are less likely to become two way traders as their nancial leverage rises
due to greater borrowing from the banks. Greater the dependence of the rms on external
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funds, high nancial leverage of rms that import only will lower their ability to expand their
trading activities. On the other hand, the impact of nancial leverage is similar within industries
characterized by low asset tangibility for rms that import only.
Firms that operate only within the national market are less likely to become two way traders
as their intensity of nancial leverage increases within industries that observe low nancial
vulnerability. This relation asserts that such rms are inhibited within industries where rms
are less likely to borrow from banks to purchase xed assets and where internal cash resources
are likely to contribute to majority of their investments. Firms that operate only within the
national market are also less likely to become two way traders as the nancial leverage increases
within industries that exhibit high levels of asset tangibility. Exposure of greater collateralizable
assets can indeed lower the survival rate of rms as their collateralizable assets are seizable.
In this paper, I raise some interesting questions regarding the e¤ects of nancial constraints
on the decision of rms to participate in a particular direction of trade and in turn the role of
capital markets in determining the trade position of countries. Hence, in the macroeconomic
sense, the contraction of domestic credit within the economy can limit rms to a particular
direction in their trading activity and reduce the ability of economies to expand their interna-
tional trading activities. In the light of the current global nancial crisis, this contributes to
the studies on the microeconomic as well the macroeconomic impact of the recent fall in credit
availability within several economies. Furthermore, the extension of this empirical study into
a detailed theoretical model that explains nancial constraints and the investment behavior of
rms given the above mentioned industry and country characteristics will contribute further to
this study.
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Dep Var: Two Way vs Exp Only Imp Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage (Extensive) 0.037** 0.151*** 0.206***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.027)
Productivity 0.007 0.013* 0.023*
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012)
Percentage of Empl. 0.000 -0.000 0.002**
with Univ. Degrees (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovation 0.037 0.067* 0.264***
(0.028) (0.035) (0.043)
Domestic Firm -0.039** -0.252*** -0.297***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.033)
Number of FT employees 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.001***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Age of Firm 0.000 0.004*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Capacity Utilization -0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Formal Training 0.045** 0.047* 0.155***
(0.018) (0.025) (0.032)
Skill Intensity -0.018 -0.056 -0.205***
(0.043) (0.045) (0.061)
Observations 1,066 2,269 1,821
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Table 1: Probit Estimation on the Extensive Margin of Financial Leverage
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var: Two Way vs Exp Only Imp Only No Int. Trade Exp Only Imp Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage -0.009 -0.037*** -0.033**
(Ratio to Indus Avg) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
Financial Leverage -0.0002 -0.001 -0.001**
(Di¤ from Least Fin Lev) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001)
Productivity 0.003 0.010 -0.002 0.002 0.011 -0.003
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
Percentage of Empl. -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001
with Univ. Degrees (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovation 0.065 0.063 0.223*** 0.065 0.072 0.227***
(0.056) (0.076) (0.082) (0.057) (0.075) (0.084)
Domestic Firm -0.057*** -0.227*** -0.205*** -0.057*** -0.228*** -0.208***
(0.019) (0.048) (0.036) (0.020) (0.049) (0.036)
Number of FT employees 0.0001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.0001** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age of Firm -0.000 0.004*** 0.001 -0.000 0.004*** 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Capacity Utilization -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Formal Training 0.005 0.099** 0.164*** 0.005 0.098** 0.164***
(0.017) (0.039) (0.047) (0.018) (0.039) (0.048)
Skill Intensity -0.036 -0.073 -0.198*** -0.036 -0.076 -0.203***
(0.037) (0.075) (0.064) (0.038) (0.075) (0.064)
Observations 336 825 596 336 825 596
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Financial Leverage Proxy 1: Ratio to Industry Average
Financial Leverage Proxy 2: Di¤erence from Least Financially Leveraged
Table 2: Probit Estimation on the Intensive Margin of Financial Leverage
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage
Dep Var: Two Way vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage (Extensive) 0.185 0.484*** 0.857***
(0.222) (0.108) (0.132)
Productivity 0.040 0.000 0.031* -0.018 0.058* 0.002
(0.062) (0.046) (0.017) (0.022) (0.031) (0.037)
Percentage of Empl. 0.001 -0.004* -0.000 -0.004** 0.006** -0.003
with Univ. Degrees (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Innovation 0.203 0.325*** 0.157* 0.156* 0.639*** 0.237***
(0.135) (0.125) (0.090) (0.093) (0.106) (0.083)
Domestic Firm -0.243** 0.160* -0.650*** 0.101 -0.947*** 0.048
(0.116) (0.095) (0.071) (0.080) (0.112) (0.097)
Number of FT employees 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age of Firm 0.002 -0.004** 0.009*** -0.004*** 0.007*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Capacity Utilization -0.001 0.004* 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Formal Training 0.257** 0.242** 0.115* 0.132** 0.399*** 0.178*
(0.100) (0.108) (0.062) (0.065) (0.089) (0.093)
Skill Intensity -0.109 -0.329** -0.135 -0.111 -0.543*** -0.275**
(0.257) (0.167) (0.113) (0.114) (0.167) (0.129)
Overdue and Relation w/ Lender 1.890*** 1.817*** 1.929***
(0.133) (0.117) (0.120)
Constant 0.737* -1.687*** -0.965*** -1.005*** -1.200*** -1.303***
(0.380) (0.299) (0.345) (0.202) (0.274) (0.249)
Underident test (p-value) 0 0 0
Weak Ident. test (F-stat) 329 400 442
Wald test of rho=0: 0.843 0.206 0.016
Observations 1,272 1,272 2,296 2,296 1,890 1,890
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Table 3: Bi Probit Estimation on the Extensive Margin of Financial Leverage
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage
Dep Var: Two Way Trader vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage -0.025 -0.152 -0.147*
(Ratio to Indus Avg) (0.155) (0.104) (0.088)
Productivity 0.032 0.046 0.015 -0.018 0.041 0.063
(0.108) (0.063) (0.018) (0.047) (0.087) (0.059)
Percentage of Empl. -0.003 0.000 0.002 0.007** 0.004 0.006*
with Univ. Degrees (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Innovation 0.495 -0.064 0.070 -0.446** 0.582** -0.514**
(0.316) (0.263) (0.191) (0.207) (0.235) (0.228)
Domestic Firm -0.590** 0.264** -0.613*** 0.129 -0.936*** 0.092
(0.273) (0.131) (0.149) (0.108) (0.188) (0.137)
Number of FT employees 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.002* -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Age of Firm -0.004 -0.001 0.009** -0.005*** 0.003 -0.005***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Capacity Utilization -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Formal Training -0.153 0.017 0.217* -0.026 0.460*** 0.056
(0.170) (0.135) (0.112) (0.108) (0.176) (0.097)
Skill Intensity -0.491 0.085 -0.056 0.188 -0.617*** 0.185
(0.389) (0.237) (0.206) (0.150) (0.234) (0.179)
Overdue and Relation w/ 0.471*** 0.362*** 0.416***
Lender (0.070) (0.064) (0.042)
Constant 6.538*** 0.528 -0.524 1.447*** 0.117 1.696***
(0.759) (0.528) (0.482) (0.276) (0.480) (0.493)
Underident Test (p-value) 0.001 0 0.006
Weak Ident (F- stat) 32 28 88
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value) 0.896 0.442 0.760
Observations 303 303 736 736 524 524
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Financial Leverage Proxy 1: Ratio to Industry Average
Table 4: IV Probit Estimation of the Intensive Margin of Financial Leverage (Ratio to Industry
Average as a Proxy)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage Sec Stage First Stage
Dep Var: Two Way Trader vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage -0.007 -0.006 -0.005
(Di¤ from Least Fin Lev) (0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Productivity 0.015 -0.248 0.028 -0.016 -0.014 -0.595
(0.108) (1.797) (0.023) (0.587) (0.045) (1.363)
Percentage of Empl. -0.001 -0.157* 0.002 0.048 0.005 -0.079
with Univ. Degrees (0.006) (0.089) (0.003) (0.074) (0.005) (0.092)
Innovation 0.384 -9.701 0.145 -9.195* 0.674*** -15.871***
(0.366) (8.352) (0.203) (4.713) (0.247) (5.165)
Domestic Firm -0.630** 3.660 -0.607*** 1.275 -0.975*** -2.624
(0.270) (3.450) (0.140) (2.687) (0.184) (3.558)
Number of FT employees 0.001** 0.001 0.001*** -0.001 0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
Age of Firm -0.001 -0.036 0.010*** -0.036 0.002 -0.068
(0.003) (0.047) (0.003) (0.045) (0.004) (0.048)
Capacity Utilization -0.002 -0.096 0.001 -0.026 -0.003 -0.111
(0.005) (0.103) (0.003) (0.060) (0.004) (0.070)
Formal Training 0.062 3.676 0.247** -1.811 0.586*** 2.313
(0.157) (4.077) (0.102) (2.917) (0.165) (2.826)
Skill Intensity -0.321 2.249 -0.157 6.257 -0.735*** 6.505
(0.362) (6.767) (0.194) (4.273) (0.228) (4.722)
Overdue and Relation w/ 18.729*** 19.753*** 22.396***
Lender (4.349) (2.635) (3.683)
Constant 6.796*** 35.547*** -0.617 37.552*** 0.049 53.392***
(0.431) (13.689) (0.506) (8.413) (0.503) (10.967)
Underident Test (p-value) 0 0 0
Weak Ident (F- stat) 33 56 38
Wald test of exogeneity (p-value) 0.652 0.452 0.995
Observations 334 334 823 823 593 593
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes 3 digit industry, EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Financial Leverage Proxy 2: Di¤erence from Least Financially Leveraged
Table 5: IV Probit Estimation on the Intensive Margin of Financial Leverage (Di¤erence From
Least Financially Leveraged Firm as a Proxy)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
External Dependence Low High Low High Low High
Dep Var: Two Way vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage (Extensive) 0.056** -0.024 0.076** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.114***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.040)
Productivity 0.005 0.001 0.010 0.007 0.019* 0.010
(0.005) (0.003) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.018)
Percentage of Empl. 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002*
with Univ. Dergee (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Innovation 0.041 0.005 0.073 0.049 0.246*** 0.200***
(0.053) (0.031) (0.062) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065)
Domestic Firm -0.036 0.015 -0.281*** -0.206*** -0.302*** -0.173***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.045) (0.045) (0.065) (0.039)
Number of FT employees 0.000 0.0001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age of Firm 0.001 0.000 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.003*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Capacity Utilization 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Formal Training 0.038 0.055** 0.104*** 0.056 0.147*** 0.088**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.035) (0.042) (0.048) (0.039)
Skill Intensity -0.021 0.104** -0.037 0.137 -0.047 -0.055
(0.048) (0.047) (0.058) (0.118) (0.086) (0.113)
Observations 434 383 850 645 642 478
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Table 6: Probit Estimation on the Extensive Margin of Financial Leverage as per External
Dependence of Industry
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
External Dependence Low High Low High Low High
Dep Var: Two Way vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 -0.059** -0.058** -0.018
(Ratio to Indus Avg) (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.014)
Productivity 0.001 -0.000 0.011 0.010 -0.003 0.010
(0.005) (0.003) (0.021) (0.006) (0.012) (0.015)
Percentage of Empl. -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.000
with Univ. Degree (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Innovation 0.299** -0.017 0.122 0.020 0.195** 0.256
(0.150) (0.029) (0.115) (0.111) (0.095) (0.165)
Domestic Firm -0.039** 0.007 -0.261*** -0.060 -0.214*** -0.075**
(0.017) (0.036) (0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.038)
Number of FT employees 0.000 0.0002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Age of Firm 0.000 -0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Capacity Utilization 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Formal Training -0.001 0.048 0.110* 0.089 0.129** 0.074
(0.022) (0.036) (0.063) (0.058) (0.061) (0.049)
Skill Intensity -0.054* 0.114* -0.103 0.168 -0.144* -0.007
(0.031) (0.065) (0.094) (0.120) (0.078) (0.053)
Observations 193 173 357 251 247 191
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Financial Leverage Proxy 1: Ratio to Industry Average
Table 7: Probit Estimation on the Intensive Margin of Financial Leverage as per External
Dependence of Industry (Ratio to Industry Average as a Proxy)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
External Dependence Low High Low High Low High
Dep Var: Two Way vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.001 -0.001** -0.002** -0.0007*
(Di¤ from Least Fin Lev) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004)
Productivity 0.000 -0.001 0.010 0.010* -0.004 0.008
(0.005) (0.003) (0.022) (0.005) (0.012) (0.016)
Percentage of Empl. -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.000
with Univ. Degrees (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Innovation 0.306** -0.017 0.123 0.028 0.219** 0.278*
(0.151) (0.029) (0.115) (0.115) (0.097) (0.166)
Domestic Firm -0.038** 0.006 -0.260*** -0.069 -0.218*** -0.076**
(0.015) (0.037) (0.063) (0.068) (0.069) (0.038)
Number of FT employees 0.000 0.0002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0001)
Age of Firm 0.000 -0.001 0.004** 0.003 0.002 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Capacity Utilization 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Formal Training 0.000 0.049 0.109* 0.098* 0.126** 0.073
(0.023) (0.034) (0.062) (0.059) (0.061) (0.049)
Skill Intensity -0.056* 0.115* -0.096 0.130 -0.145* -0.034
(0.030) (0.063) (0.095) (0.125) (0.077) (0.059)
Observations 193 173 357 251 247 191
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Financial Leverage Proxy 2: Di¤erence from Least Financially Leveraged
Table 8: Probit Estimation on the Intensive Margin of Financial Leverage as per External
Dependence of Industry (Di¤erence From Least Financially Leveraged Firm as a Proxy)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset Tangibility Low High Low High Low High
Dep Var: Two Way vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage (Extensive) 0.014 0.029 0.129*** 0.074 0.149*** 0.140**
(0.020) (0.034) (0.032) (0.047) (0.033) (0.055)
Productivity 0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.016 0.004 0.069**
(0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.029)
Percentage of Empl. 0.000 0.002 -0.001 0.003** 0.001 0.004**
with Univ. Degrees (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Innovation 0.018 0.054 0.092* 0.006 0.228*** 0.199***
(0.033) (0.069) (0.055) (0.070) (0.061) (0.062)
Domestic Firm 0.002 -0.059** -0.220*** -0.295*** -0.203*** -0.322***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.043) (0.053) (0.047) (0.064)
Number of FT employees 0.0001* 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.0004*
(0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002)
Age of Firm 0.000 0.000 0.002** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Capacity Utilization 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Formal Training 0.010 0.133*** 0.085** 0.072 0.094*** 0.174***
(0.019) (0.041) (0.037) (0.045) (0.035) (0.057)
Skill Intensity 0.027 0.063 -0.001 0.038 -0.051 -0.092
(0.039) (0.054) (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) (0.091)
Observations 527 290 940 555 712 408
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Table 9: Probit Estimation on the External Margin of Financial Leverage as per Asset Tangibility
of Industry
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset Tangibility Low High Low High Low High
Dep Var: Two Way vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage 0.015 -0.043*** -0.042** -0.071* -0.016 -0.122***
(Ratio to Indus Avg) (0.010) (0.015) (0.020) (0.041) (0.011) (0.039)
Productivity -0.001 -0.003 0.008 0.036 0.001 0.026
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.037) (0.004) (0.034)
Percentage of Empl. -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003* 0.000 0.005**
with Univ. Degrees (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Innovation 0.076 0.369* 0.072 0.137 0.191 0.448***
(0.078) (0.212) (0.094) (0.164) (0.128) (0.155)
Domestic Firm -0.033 -0.005 -0.182*** -0.184** -0.086* -0.184**
(0.033) (0.023) (0.063) (0.085) (0.050) (0.072)
Number of FT employees 0.000 0.0001* 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000)
Age of Firm 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.005** 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Capacity Utilization 0.000 -0.002** 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Formal Training -0.017 0.047 0.129* 0.081 0.033 0.131**
(0.022) (0.043) (0.067) (0.063) (0.030) (0.066)
Skill Intensity 0.028 0.021 -0.036 0.025 -0.057 -0.074
(0.033) (0.039) (0.105) (0.123) (0.051) (0.085)
Observations 233 133 355 253 273 165
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Financial Leverage Proxy 1: Ratio to Industry Average
Table 10: Probit Estimation on the Intensive Margin of Financial Leverage as per Asset Tangi-
bility of Industry (Ratio to Industry Average as a Proxy)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset Tangibility Low High Low Hgh Low High
Dep Var: Two Way vs Export Only Import Only No Int. Trade
Financial Leverage -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.001** -0.001 -0.001* -0.002***
(Di¤ from Least Fin Lev) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Productivity 0.000 -0.018 0.008 0.035 -0.001 0.035
(0.004) (0.016) (0.006) (0.031) (0.004) (0.032)
Percentage of Empl. -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.003*
with Univ. Degrees (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Innovation 0.081 0.279 0.083 0.122 0.217 0.402**
(0.076) (0.218) (0.097) (0.163) (0.133) (0.158)
Domestic Firm -0.035 -0.036 -0.180*** -0.195** -0.084* -0.207***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.066) (0.080) (0.050) (0.067)
Number of FT employees 0.000 0.0001* 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age of Firm 0.000 -0.001 0.002 0.005** 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Capacity Utilization -0.000 -0.002** 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Formal Training -0.017 0.099** 0.136** 0.073 0.030 0.132**
(0.024) (0.050) (0.068) (0.064) (0.031) (0.067)
Skill Intensity 0.025 0.064 -0.049 0.028 -0.066 -0.091
(0.034) (0.044) (0.109) (0.121) (0.057) (0.080)
Observations 233 133 355 253 273 165
Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Includes EU membership and year dummies
Dependent Variable are dummy variables with two way traders assigned a value of 1.
Financial Leverage Proxy 2: Di¤erence from Least Financially Leveraged
Table 11: Probit Estimation on the Intensive Margin of Financial Leverage as per Asset Tangi-
bility of Industry (Di¤erence From Least Financially Leveraged Firm as a Proxy)
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Figures
Distribution of Firms as per Trade Activity and Financial Leverage
2004 2008
Percentage of Firms Participating in Trade
Domestic Trade Only 34 21
Exports Only 5 3
Imports Only 32 44
Exports and Imports 28 32
Distribution of Firms as per Financial Leverage
% of Firms Financially Leveraged 29 39
Financial Leverage
% of Domestic Traders Only with Financial Leverage 20 27
% of Firms that Export Only with Financial Leverage 34 45
% of Firms that Import Only with Financial Leverage 28 36
% of Two way traders with Financial Leverage 38 47
Intensity of Financial Leverage (Assets financed by Bank Loans)
% of Domestic Traders Only 57 67
% of Firms that Export Only 61 55
% of Firms that Import Only 54 59
% of Two way traders 57 57
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Median of Asset Tangibility
Country Indicator Fitted values
At the Country-Level
Correlation between the Medians of External Dependence and Asset Tangibility
Figure 2: Correlation Between the Medians of External Dependence and Asset Tangibility at
the Country Level
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Figure 3: Distribution of Trading Activties of Firms per Industry Level External Dependence




Financial Leverage (Extensive) Dummy variable ( 1 if fixed assets funded by private or
state owned banks)
Financial Leverage (Intensive)
% of fixed assets funded by private or state owned banks.
Proxy 1  is the ratio to 4 digit industry average for given
country in a given year. Proxy 2  is the difference between
the firm and  the least financially leveraged firm within 4
digit industry industry for a given country in a given year.
Percentage of Employees with a University Degree Self -explanatory
Innovation Introduced new products or services or upgraded existing
product line in last 3 years  [Dummy Variable]
Domestic Firm Less than 10% of the firm owned by a foreign entity
[Dummy Variable]
Productivity
Sales less cost of production (sum of material and labor
costs) divided by number of full-time production workers.
[Value added/ number of full-time production workers]
Capacity Utilization
The percentage of the maximum level of production this
firm can attain by fully utilizing the machinery, equipment
and its employees
Age of Firm Number of years the firm has been in operation in the
country
# of Full Time Employees
Paid employees that are contracted for a term of one or
more fiscal years and work up to 8 or more hours per day
Formal Training
Has structured and defined curriculum. Includes
classwork, seminar, audio visual presentations, lectures,
workshop and demonstrations. [Dummy Variable]
Skill Intensity
Fraction of workers that have special knowledge or ability
(acquired) in work. Excludes workers above the working-
supervisor level. Skill worker may have attended college,
university or technical school or may have learned the
skills on the job.
Note: Descriptions borrowed from the ‘Questionnaire Note’
at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org. Source of all
variables listed above is Enterprise Surveys
(http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The Word Bank.
Appendix A: Description of Control Variables
Note: Productivity is listed as ratio to the average of the productivity measure across rms
at 4 digit ISIC industry level for a given country at a given year. For instance, the productivity
for Firm A in industry code ISIC 1511 in Russia in 2008 is calculated as the productivity of










ALB Albania No 96
ARM Armenia No 329
AZE Azerbaijan No 326
BLR Belarus No 157
BIH Bosnia and Herzegovina No 178
BGR Bulgaria No 153
HRV Croatia No 103
CZE Czech Republic Yes 167
EST Estonia Yes 131
GEO Georgia No 161
HUN Hungary Yes 473
KAZ Kazakhstan No 520
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic No 141
LTU Latvia Yes 124
LVA Lithuania Yes 142
MKD Macedonia, FYR No 152
MDA Moldova No 314
MNE Montenegro No 41
POL Poland Yes 631
ROM Romania No 563
RUS Russian Federation No 807
SRB Serbia No 213
SVK Slovak Republic Yes 121
SVK Slovenia Yes 159
TJK Tajikistan No 164
UKR Ukraine No 732
UZB Uzbekistan No 190
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Domestic Credit (% of GDP) and Median of External Dependence and Asset Tangibility
Appendix E: Correlation of Domestic Credit and Median of External Dependence and Asset
Tangibility at the Country Level.






Neither 387 678 462 603
Exports Only 87 87 68 106
Imports Only 713 1081 676 1118
Two Way Traders 665 708 485 888
Appendix F: Number of Observations per Industry Characteristics
55
